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T IMOTHY R. POWELL 

Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust:
Congressional Intent Interpreted Through a Plain
Reading of the Federal Bankruptcy Code

In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (“Franklin III”),1 the Supreme
Court analyzed whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Puerto Rico”) is a
“State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision of 11 U.S.C. § 903.2 The Court
held that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision but is a
“State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision, and therefore federal law preempts the Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act Recovery Act
(“Recovery Act”).3 While the Supreme Court Majority correctly came to its holding
by interpreting the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code,4 First Circuit Judge Torruella5
and the Dissenting Justices in Franklin III provide their own interesting
interpretations of the issue at hand.6
I. THE CASE

In May of 1941, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority Act
(“Authority Act”) which created the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
(“PREPA”) and authorized PREPA to issue bonds. 7 The Authority Act explicitly
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Timothy R. Powell will be graduating from the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law in May of 2018. He received his bachelors from the University of Texas at Austin. He would like to thank
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1.
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
2.
Id. at 1942.
3.
Id. at 1949.
4.
Id. at 1946.
5.
See infra Part IV.B.
6.
See infra Part III.B.
7.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin I), 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583 (D.P.R. 2015), judgment
entered, No. 14-1518 FAB, 2015 WL 574008 (D.P.R. Feb. 10, 2015), and aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, §§ 191–239
(2012)).
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PUERTO RICO V. FRANKLIN CALIFORNIA TAX-FREE TRUST
guaranteed PREPA bondholders “that [Puerto Rico] will not limit or alter the rights
or powers hereby vested in [PREPA] until all such bonds at any time issued, together
with the interest thereon, are fully met and discharged”8 and expressly gave PREPA
bondholders the right to appoint a receiver if PREPA defaults on any of its bonds. 9
On January 1, 1974, PREPA issued the bonds underlying the matters in this case
pursuant to a trust agreement (“Trust Agreement”)10 with U.S. Bank National
Association as Successor Trustee.11 Amongst other obligations, the Trust Agreement
contractually requires PREPA to pay principal and interest on bonds promptly and
secures bondholders’ bonds by a pledge of PREPA’s present and future revenues.12
Additionally, the Trust Agreement prohibits PREPA from creating a lien equal to or
senior to bondholders’ liens on these revenues. 13 Furthermore, in the event of a
default, the Trust Agreement permits bondholders to accelerate payments, seek the
appointment of a receiver as guaranteed in the Authority Act, and sue to enforce the
terms of the Trust Agreement.14 The Trust Agreement provides that an event of
default may occur when PREPA institutes a proceeding “for the purpose of effecting
a composition between [PREPA] and its creditors or for the purpose of adjusting the
claims of such creditors pursuant to any federal or Commonwealth statute now or
hereafter enacted.”15
In June of 2014, the House of Representatives and the Senate of Puerto Rico
approved, and the Governor of Puerto Rico signed into law, the Recovery Act to
address the state of fiscal emergency concerning the potential insolvency of some of
Puerto Rico’s public corporations, including PREPA.16 Puerto Rico modeled the

8.

Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 215).
Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 207).
10.
Id. The Trust Agreement was amended and supplemented through August 1, 2011. Id.
11.
Id.
12.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin I), 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 583 (D.P.R. 2015), judgment
entered, No. 14-1518 FAB, 2015 WL 574008 (D.P.R. Feb. 10, 2015), and aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Trust Agreement § 701).
13.
Id. (citing Trust Agreement § 712).
14.
Id. (citing Trust Agreement §§ 802–804).
15.
Id. (quoting Trust Agreement § 802(g)).
16.
Id. at 583–84 (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. of Motives, § A). Puerto Rico enacted the Recovery Act to
ameliorate the fiscal situations of several of its public corporations, including PREPA, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct
and Sewer Authority (“PRASA”), and the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”),
whose combined debt totaled twenty billion dollars. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d
322, 331 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin
California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Recovery Act, Stmt.
of Motives, § A). Traditionally, the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (“GDB”) provided financing
to enable Puerto Rico’s public utilities to continue operating without defaulting on their debt obligations, but the
GDB was facing its own financial crisis at the time the Recovery Act was created. Puerto Rico v. Franklin
California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016).
9.
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TIMOTHY R. POWELL
Recovery Act after Chapter 9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, which “governs the
adjustments of debts of a municipality,”17 because, as will be discussed in detail in
Section III(A), Puerto Rico’s municipalities are expressly prohibited from filing
under Chapter 9.18 Unless expressly prohibited from doing so, a U.S. municipality
may adjust its debts under Chapter 9, but only with specific authorization from its
state.19 Additionally, the Title 11 definition of “municipality” in the Federal
Bankruptcy Code includes a public agency or instrumentality of the state, like
PREPA.20
The Recovery Act established two procedures for Puerto Rico’s public
corporations to restructure their debts21 and created the Public Sector Debt
Enforcement and Recovery Act Courtroom (“Special Court”) to “preside over
proceedings and cases brought pursuant to these two procedures.”22 The first
restructuring procedure, as explained in Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act, provides that,
with authorization from the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico
(“GDB”), an eligible public corporation may propose “amendments, modifications,
waivers, and/or exchanges to or of a class of specified debt instruments” to seek debt
relief from its creditors.23 “If creditors representing at least fifty percent of the debt
in a given class vote on whether to accept the changes, and at least seventy-five
percent of participating voters approve, then the [S]pecial [C]ourt may issue an order
approving the transaction and binding the entire class.” 24 The second restructuring
procedure, as set forth in Chapter 3 of the Recovery Act, provides that, again with
authorization from the GDB, an eligible public corporation may submit a
restructuring plan petition to the Special Court that lists the amounts and types of
claims that will be affected as well as submits a proposed restructuring plan or
proposed transfer of the public corporation’s assets.25 This procedure mirrors Chapter
9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code in that it involves “a court-supervised restructuring
process intended to offer the best solution for the broadest group of creditors.” 26 If

17.

Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. of Motives, § E; 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.).
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(52)).
19.
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)).
20.
11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012).
21.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (citing Recovery Act, Stmt. of Motives, §§ A, E).
22.
Id. (citing Recovery Act § 109(a)).
23.
Id. (citing Recovery Act §§ 201(b), 202(a)). This relief included changing interest rates or the maturity
date of bondholders’ debts. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938,
1943 (2016) (citation omitted).
24.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (citing Recovery Act §§ 115(b), 202(d), 204).
25.
Id. (citing Recovery Act §§ 301(d), 310).
26.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing 2014 P.R. Laws 371, 448–49).
18.
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PUERTO RICO V. FRANKLIN CALIFORNIA TAX-FREE TRUST
the plan meets certain requirements,27 the Special Court may confirm the plan,
thereby binding all of the public corporation’s creditors to the proposed
restructuring.28
Following the passage of the Recovery Act, the Plaintiffs, two groups of
bondholders collectively holding nearly two billion dollars of bonds issued by
PREPA, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
against Puerto Rico (“District Court”), PREPA, agents of the GDB (in their official
capacity), the Governor of Puerto Rico Alejandro Garcia-Padilla (in his official
capacity), and the Attorney General/Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico Cesar
Miranda-Rodriguez (in his official capacity) to declare the Recovery Act
unconstitutional and enjoin its implementation.29 The first group of Plaintiffs,
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust30 and Oppenheimer Rochester31 (collectively
referred to as the “Franklin Plaintiffs”), filed their original complaint on June 28,
201432 and their second amended complaint33 as well as their cross-motion for

27.
Including the requirement that “at least one class of affected debt has voted to accept the plan by a
majority of all votes cast in such class and two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected debt in such class that
is voted.” Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584 (quoting Recovery Act § 315(e)).
28.
Id. (citing Recovery Act §§ 315(e), 115(c)). It should also be noted that Chapter 2 of the Recovery Act
permits a suspension period and that Chapter 3 permits an automatic stay, both of which prevent creditors from
asserting claims or exercising contractual remedies against the public corporation debtor. Id. (citing Recovery
Act §§ 205, 304).
29.
Id. at 584–86, 586 n.3; Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free
Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). Both groups of Plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico’s
Governor, Alejandro Garcia-Padilla, and agents of the GDB, but only the Franklin Plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico
itself and PREPA itself, while only the BlueMountain Plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Justice, Cesar
Miranda-Rodriguez. Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 326 n.3.
30.
Delaware corporations or trusts that collectively hold approximately $692,855,000 of PREPA bonds.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 584–85 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 85 at ¶ 3); see id. at 584 n.1
(referencing all of the parties encompassed by the Franklin California Tax-Free Trust plaintiffs).
31.
Delaware statutory trusts that collectively hold approximately $866,165,000 of PREPA bonds. Id. at
585 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 85 at ¶ 4); see id. at 585 n.2 (referencing all of the parties encompassed
by the Oppenheimer Rochester plaintiffs).
32.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 325.
33.
The Franklin Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief on multiple claims: (1) that the Recovery Act is preempted by 11 U.S.C. § 903 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code; (2) that the Recovery Act violates the Bankruptcy
Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) that §§ 108, 115, 202, 312, 315, and 325 of the Recovery Act
specifically “violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution by impairing the contractual
obligations imposed by the Authority Act and the Trust Agreement;” (4) that the Recovery Act violates the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution by taking plaintiffs’ contractual right to seek the appointment
of a receiver without just compensation; (5) that § 304 of the Recovery Act “unconstitutionally authorizes a stay
of federal court proceedings when a public corporation files for debt relief pursuant to the Recovery Act.”
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin I), 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 585 (D.P.R. 2015), judgment entered, No.
14-1518 FAB, 2015 WL 574008 (D.P.R. Feb. 10, 2015), and aff’d, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
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summary judgment34 on August 11, 2014.35 The second group of Plaintiffs,
BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC (“BlueMountain Plaintiffs”)36
(collectively, the Franklin Plaintiffs and the BlueMountain Plaintiffs will be referred
to as the “Plaintiffs”), filed their original complaint on July 22, 201437 and their
amended complaint on August 12, 2014.38 Both groups of Plaintiffs argued that the
enactment of the Recovery Act impaired the contractual obligations between PREPA
and PREPA’s bondholders, as laid out in the Trust Agreement and the Authority Act,
by annulling certain protections and rights that were promised.39 These impaired
protections and rights include: (1) that PREPA’s rights would not be altered until all
PREPA bonds were fully satisfied and discharged;40 (2) that bondholders have the
right to seek the appointment of a receiver if PREPA defaults;41 (3) that PREPA will
not create a lien equal to or senior to the bondholder’s lien on PREPA’s present or
future revenues;42 (4) that the bondholders have a right to accelerate payment if
PREPA defaults;43 and (5) that PREPA is deemed in default if it institutes a

136 S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct.
582 (2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 85 at ¶¶ 58–71).
34.
The Franklin Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was in regards to their pre-emption and stay of
federal court proceedings claims. Id. at 585-86 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 78).
35.
Id. at 585-86.
36.
A Delaware company that holds more than $400,000,000 of PREPA bonds. Id. at 586 (citing Civil No.
14-1569, Docket No. 20 at ¶ 6).
37.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
38.
The BlueMountain Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief on multiple claims: (1) that the Recovery Act is
pre-empted by the Federal Bankruptcy Code; (2) that the Recovery Act violates the Bankruptcy Clause of the
United States Constitution; (3) “that the Recovery Act impairs the contractual obligations imposed by the
Authority Act and the Trust Agreement and therefore violates the contract clauses of the United States and Puerto
Rico constitutions;” (4) that §§ 205 and 304 of the Recovery Act “unconstitutionally authorize a stay of federal
court proceedings when a public corporation files for debt relief pursuant to the Recovery Act.” Franklin I, 85 F.
Supp. 3d at 586 (citing Civil No. 14-1569, Docket No. 20).
39.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 325.
40.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 215). Plaintiffs allege that the
Recovery Act altered PREPA’s rights thereby eliminating Puerto Rico’s express guarantee. Id.
41.
Id. (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 22, § 207). Cf. Authority Act § 17 and Trust Agreement § 804 with
Recovery Act § 108(b).
42.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (citing Trust Agreement § 712). Plaintiffs allege that the Recovery
Act permits PREPRA to obtain credit secured by a lien that is senior to the Plaintiffs’ lien. See id. at 590, 590
n.8; Recovery Act §§ 129(d), 206(a), 322(c).
43.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590 (citing Trust Agreement § 803). Plaintiffs allege the Recovery Act’s
suspension provision, stay provision, and post-plan approval provision eliminate Plaintiffs right to accelerate
payments. See id. at 590 & 590 n.9; Recovery Act §§ 205, 304, 115(b)(2), 115(c)(3).
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PUERTO RICO V. FRANKLIN CALIFORNIA TAX-FREE TRUST
proceeding “for the purpose of effecting a composition between [PREPA] and its
creditors or for the purpose of adjusting the claims of such creditors.”44
Both groups of Plaintiffs “sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02
that the Recovery Act is pre-empted by the federal Bankruptcy Code, violates the
Contract[] Clause, violates the Bankruptcy Clause, and unconstitutionally authorizes
a stay of federal court proceedings.”45 On August 20, 2014, the District Court
consolidated the briefing schedules of both Plaintiffs’ cases, Civil Case Nos. 14-1518
and 14-1569, but did not merge the suits into a single cause of action or change the
rights of the parties because the individual cases had multiple, relevant distinctions. 46
On September 12, 2014, the Puerto Rican Defendants47 filed a motion to dismiss the
Franklin Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, opposed the Franklin Plaintiffs’
cross-motion for summary judgment, and moved to dismiss the BlueMountain
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, alleging that all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are unripe
and fail on the merits, as a matter of law.48 PREPA joined the Puerto Rican
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Franklin Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint
and opposition to the cross-motion for summary judgment. 49 Additionally, PREPA
filed its own motion to dismiss arguing that the Franklin Plaintiffs lacked standing
and that their claims were unripe.50 On February 6, 2015, after the Franklin Plaintiffs
and the BlueMountain Plaintiffs opposed the Puerto Rican Defendants’ motions51

44.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 590-91 (citing Trust Agreement § 802(g)). Plaintiffs allege the Recovery
Act expressly renders this Trust Agreement ipso facto clause unenforceable. See id. at 590-91 & 591 n.10;
Recovery Act § 325(a). See also Recovery Act § 205(c).
45.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016). The Franklin Plaintiffs also brought a Takings Claim under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments while the BlueMountain Plaintiffs brought an additional Contract Clause Claim
under the Puerto Rican Constitution. Id.
46.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 586 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 92; Civil No. 14-1569, Docket
No. 26). The cases were not merged because: (1) the Franklin Plaintiffs brought suit against Puerto Rico and
PREPA while the BlueMountain Plaintiffs only brought suit against Puerto Rico; (2) only the Franklin Plaintiffs
brought a Takings Clause Claim; (3) only the BlueMountain Plaintiffs brought a Puerto Rico Constitution
Contract Clause Claim. Id.
47.
The Puerto Rican defendants include: Puerto Rico, the Governor of Puerto Rico (Alejandro GarciaPadilla), the Attorney General/Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico (Cesar R. Miranda Rodriguez), and the GDB
agents (Melba Acosta and John Doe). Id. at 586 n.3.
48.
Id. at 586-87 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 95, mem. at Docket No. 95-1; Civil No. 14-1569,
Docket No. 29, mem. at Docket No. 29-1).
49.
Id. at 587 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 97 at p. 1).
50.
Id. (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 97).
51.
Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 587 (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 102; Civil No. 14-1569, Docket
No. 41).
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and the Puerto Rican Defendants and PREPA replied,52 the District Court issued an
order and opinion in both cases.53
In analyzing the claims and motions before it, the District Court looked at the text,
history, purpose, and context of the clauses, especially the pre-emption clause of 11
U.S.C. § 903(1), and ultimately held that the Recovery Act was pre-empted by
federal law and permanently enjoined its enforcement.54 The District Court also
denied the motion to dismiss the Contract Clause claim, denied the motion to dismiss
one of the Franklin Plaintiffs’ Takings Clause claims, dismissed without prejudice
all claims asserted against PREPA for lack of standing, and dismissed without
prejudice the remaining claims for lack of ripeness.55 Subsequently, the Puerto Rican
Defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit “from
the permanent injunction, the grant of summary judgment to the Franklin plaintiffs, 56
and further argue[d] that the District Court erred by reaching the Contract[] Clause
and Takings Claims in its February 6 order.”57
The First Circuit reasoned that the primary legal issue on appeal in this case was
whether 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) pre-empted the Recovery Act and further stated that this
issue turns on whether the amended definition of “State”58 in the Federal Bankruptcy
Code renders 11 U.S.C. § 903(1)’s pre-emptive effect inapplicable to Puerto Rico.59
Ultimately, the First Circuit concluded, based on a lack of legislative history to read
the Federal Bankruptcy Code otherwise, that the amendment did not remove Puerto
Rico from the scope of the pre-emption provision and affirmed the District Court’s
holding that the pre-emption provision barred the Recovery Act.60 Furthermore, the
First Circuit opined that only Congress had the authority to decide whether Puerto
Rico’s municipalities could seek Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief.61 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted the Defendants’ petitions for writs of certiorari.62

52.

Id. (citing Civil No. 14-1518, Docket No. 108-09; Civil No. 14-1569, Docket No. 44).
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 326 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 326, 326 n.4.
56.
Id. at 327. The grant of summary judgment was only in regards to the pre-emption claim of the Franklin
Plaintiffs. Franklin I, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
57.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 327.
58.
See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 421(j)(6),
101(44), 98 Stat. 333, 338-39 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(52)). “The post-1984 definition of ‘State’
includes Puerto Rico, ‘except’ for the purposes of ‘defining’ a municipal debtor under § 109(c).” Franklin II, 805
F.3d at 325 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(52), 109(c)) (emphasis added).
59.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 325.
60.
Id. at 336-37.
61.
Id. at 337 & 345.
62.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016).
53.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The United States bankruptcy system has evolved since its initial enactment. As the
necessity for newer and better bankruptcy laws developed throughout the years,
Congress used its constitutional authority to establish and amend these laws. 63 To
understand why Puerto Rico enacted the Recovery Act and whether it was
constitutional, it is necessary to look at the text and history of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code, specifically three provisions: the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) gateway provision, the 11
U.S.C. § 903(1) pre-emption provision, and the 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) definition of
“State.”64
A. The Early History of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, the Development of the
Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Scheme, and the Origin of the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)
Gateway Provision
The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish uniform Laws on Bankruptcy
throughout the United States.65 In 1800, Congress first exercised this power by
enacting a series of temporary bankruptcy Acts which led to a permanent bankruptcy
scheme in 1898.66 Initially, it was presumed that “constitutional limitations precluded
either level of government, state or federal, from enacting a municipal bankruptcy
regime.”67 This is so because municipalities are government entities, and thus the
methods for addressing their insolvency are more limited than the procedures for
addressing corporate or individual insolvency.68 In the beginning, states couldn’t
enact a municipal bankruptcy regime without allegedly violating the Contract
Clause, and the federal government couldn’t do so without violating the states’ rights
to control their own municipalities under the Tenth Amendment. 69 However, in 1933
and out of necessity due to the Great Depression, Congress began developing a
municipal bankruptcy scheme by enacting what came to be the precursor to Chapter

63.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016).
65.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
66.
Id. (citing An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 541,
30 Stat. 544; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 184 (1902)).
67.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 327 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing M.W. McConnell & R.C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427–28 (1993)).
68.
Id. (citing M.W. McConnell & R.C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426–50 (1993)); see also id. at 327 n.5.
69.
Id. at 327–28 (citing M.W. McConnell & R.C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 426-28 (1993)); see also id. at 327 n.6.
64.
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9 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code which gave the states “a mechanism for addressing
municipal insolvency that they could not create themselves.”70
Since the inception of these federal municipal bankruptcy laws, Congress has tried
to preserve the States’ powers over their municipalities.71 In Ashton v. Cameron
County Water Improvement Dist. No. One,72 the Supreme Court struck down
Congress’ first attempt to enable the states’ municipalities to file for federal
bankruptcy relief by concluding that the statute infringed the States’ powers “to
manage their own affairs”73 and thereby violated the Tenth Amendment.74 In 1937,
Congress amended its 1933 statute to avoid this Tenth Amendment problem by
requiring a state’s consent in the federal municipal bankruptcy regime
before permitting municipalities of the state to seek relief under it, and in
part by emphasizing that the statute did not effect “any restriction on the
powers of the States or their arms of government in the exercise of their
sovereign rights and duties.”75
The Supreme Court upheld the 1937 amended statute in United States v. Bekins76
because it believed the amended statute appropriately balanced federal and state
power by requiring that the state first authorize its instrumentality to seek relief under
the federal bankruptcy laws.77 The Bekins ruling is the origin of the 11 U.S.C. §
109(c) state-authorization requirement, also known as the “gateway provision,”
which requires a state to “authorize [its] municipalities to seek relief under Chapter
9 before the municipalities may file a Chapter 9 petition.” 78 Title 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)
provides:

70.
Id. at 328 (citing McConnell & Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal
Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 427-29, 450–54 (1993)).
71.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944.
72.
Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
73.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531).
74.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 328.
75.
Id. (citing United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49–54 (1938) (citation omitted)).
76.
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49–54 (1938).
77.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47–49, 53–54). The requirement that states
give their municipalities consent to seek relief under the federal bankruptcy laws both creates a cooperative statefederal Chapter 9 scheme and “promotes sovereignty by preventing municipalities from strategically seeking (or
threatening to seek) federal municipal relief to ‘reduce the conditions that states place on a proposed bailout.’”
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 329 (quoting C.P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 285–86 (2012)).
78.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944.
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11 U.S.C. § 109. Who may be a debtor
*

*

*

*

(c) An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if
such entity—
(1) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name,
to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental
officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity
to be a debtor under such chapter. . .79
*

*

*

*

B. The Evolution of the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Scheme, How it Applies to
the States, and the Congressional Enactment of the 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) Pre-emption
Provision
In 1946, the federal bankruptcy laws evolved again to bar states from enacting their
own municipal bankruptcy schemes.80 In 1942, the Supreme Court ruled in Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park81 that “federal bankruptcy laws did not pre-empt
New Jersey’s municipal bankruptcy scheme, which required municipalities to seek
relief under state law before resorting to the federal municipal bankruptcy scheme.”82
In response to Faitoute, Congress enacted Section 83(i) in 1946 which overturned
Faitoute and expressly pre-empted state municipal bankruptcy laws.83 Congress
sought to preserve Section 83(i) when it re-codified it, with some changes, in 1978

79.
80.
81.

11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1944–45.
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 507-09

82.
(1942)).
83.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 334–35 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136
S. Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (citing Act of July 1, 1946, Pub.L. No. 481, Ch. 532, sec. 83(i), 60 Stat.
409, 415). Section 83(i), as enacted in 1946, read as follows:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the power of any State to
control, by legislation or otherwise, any municipality or any political subdivision of or in such
State . . . Provided, however, That no State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness
of such agencies shall be binding upon any creditor who does not consent to such composition, and
no judgment shall be entered under such State law which would bind a creditor to such composition
without his consent.
Act of July 1, 1946, Pub.L. No. 481, ch. 532, sec. 83(i), 60 Stat. 409, 415.
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as 11 U.S.C. § 903(1), also known today as the “pre-emption provision.”84 The
modern pre-emption provision reads as follows:
11 U.S.C. § 903. Reservation of State Power to Control Municipalities
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by
legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise
of the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including
expenditures for such exercise, but—
(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such
composition; and
(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does
not consent to such composition.85
C. The History of the Definition of “State” in the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
The third provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Code at issue in this case is the
definition of “State,” which has included territories in its definition since the first
Federal Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1898, the same year Puerto Rico became a
territory of the United States.86 However, “when Congress re-codified the bankruptcy
laws to form the Federal Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the definition of ‘State’” was left
out of the definitions section.87 In response to this omission, which was not the
primary purpose of the Act,88 Congress amended the Federal Bankruptcy Code in
1984 to reincorporate the definition of “State,” as codified in 11 U.S.C. § 101(52).89
“The amended definition includes Puerto Rico as a State for purposes of the Code
with one exception:”90

84.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 335 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989 at 110). Congress felt this re-codification was
necessary “to maintain the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws be preventing states from ‘enact[ing] their own
versions of Chapter [9].’” Id. (quoting L.P. King, Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old and New; Chapter IX
Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 65 (1976)).
85.
11 U.S.C. § 903.
86.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing 30 Stat. 545). The 1898 Federal Bankruptcy Act definition of
“State” also included “the Indian Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia.” Id. (citing 30 Stat. 545).
87.
Id. (citing Bankruptcy Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2549–2554).
88.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 330 n.11.
89.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (citing § 421, 98 Stat. 368–69).
90.
Id.
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11 U.S.C. § 101. Definitions
In this title the following definitions shall apply:
*

*

*

*

(52) The term “State” includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9
of this title.91
*

*

*

*

This exception, which was not in previous versions of the definition of “State,”
“deprived Puerto Rico of the power to grant its municipalities the authorization
required by § 109(c)(2) to file for Chapter 9 relief.”92 Franklin III, as will be
discussed later, centers around “whether this change was also meant to transform the
preemption provision of § 903(1) without Congress expressly saying so.” 93
D. Puerto Rico and Its Relationship to the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Scheme
Puerto Rico has been able to issue bonds, and authorize its municipalities to issue
bonds, since 1917.94 However, if Puerto Rico’s municipalities can’t meet their bond
obligations, they, like state municipalities, are excluded from bankruptcy relief under
the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.95 Additionally, “from 1938 until the
modern Bankruptcy Code was introduced in 1978, Puerto Rico, like the states, could
authorize its municipalities to obtain federal municipal bankruptcy relief.”96 While
the definition of “State” was left out of the Code from 1978 to 1984, most scholars
agree that this did not affect Puerto Rico’s right to authorize its municipalities to seek
bankruptcy relief.97 However, when Congress re-introduced the definition of “State”

91.
92.
93.

11 U.S.C § 101(52).
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 331. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 331.
Id. at 329 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 3, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C.

94.
§ 741)).
95.
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109).
96.
Id. at 329-30 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(29), 403(e)(6) (1938); 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1934); Bekins, 304 U.S. at
49, accord 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(29), 404 (1976); 48 U.S.C. § 734 (1976); see also S.J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553, 572 (2014)). Puerto Rico’s power to provide state authorization,
which was required for plan confirmation, was derived from (1) the Bankruptcy Act’s definition of “State,” in
effect from 1938–1978, which defined “State” to include territories and (2) the extension of United States laws
to Puerto Rico. Franklin II, 806 F.3d at 329 n.9.
97.
Franklin II, 806 F.3d at 330 (citing Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1998); In re Segarra,
14 B.R. 870, 872–73 (D.P.R. 1981)); see also Franklin II, 806 F.3d at 330 n.10.
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in 1984, it defined “State” to include Puerto Rico as it had before 1978, but it also
added the phrase, “except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under
chapter 9 of [the Bankruptcy Code].”98 As a result, Puerto Rico was expressly,
though indirectly, deprived of the right to authorize its municipalities to file for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109(c).99 Put differently,
Puerto Rico could not file for Chapter 9 without first obtaining congressional
approval.100 Without the ability to authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9
relief, and facing an imminent fiscal crisis, Puerto Rico took matters into its own
hands and enacted its own municipal bankruptcy laws, the Recovery Act, “to cover
the purported gap created by the 1984 amendment.” 101 The Recovery Act permitted
Puerto Rico’s municipalities, who were not authorized for federal Chapter 9 relief,
“to seek Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 relief, either simultaneously or sequentially, with
approval from the GDB.”102 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
constitutionality of the Recovery Act based on the aforementioned Bankruptcy Code
provisions.103
III. THE COURT’S REASONING

In Franklin III, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit by holding that federal law pre-empts the Recovery
Act.104 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Thomas supported his holding
by analyzing the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code.105 Justice Sotomayor, with whom
Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented.106
A. The Majority Argues that the Plain Wording of the Bankruptcy Code Provides
for Congress’ Intent
The Majority began its review by discussing the facts and procedural history of the
case.107 In particular, the Majority focused on the text and history of three provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code that are necessary to decide whether Puerto Rico is a “State”

98.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 330-31 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(52); compare id., with Act of June 22, 1938,
Pub. L. No. 696, ch. 575, § 1(29), 52 Stat. 840, 842).
99.
Id. at 331. “Puerto Rico now lacks the power it once had been granted by Congress to authorize its
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 relief.” Id. at 325.
100.
Id. at 331.
101.
Id. at 331–32.
102.
Id. at 332. (citing Recovery Act, §§ 112, 201(b), 301(a)).
103.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016)
104.
Id. at 1949.
105.
Id. at 1946.
106.
Id. at 1949.
107.
Id. at 1942–43.
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for purposes of the pre-emption provision.108 These three provisions include: (1) the
11 U.S.C. § 109(c) “gateway provision,” (2) the 11 U.S.C. § 903 “pre-emption
provision,” and (3) the 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) definition of “State.”109 The Majority
identified the issues in this case as
whether, in light of the amended definition [of “State”], Puerto Rico is
no longer a “State” only for purposes of the gateway provision, which
requires States to authorize their municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief,
or whether Puerto Rico is also no longer a “State” for purposes of the
pre-emption provision.110
The Majority noted and both parties agreed that, prior to the 1984 amendment,
Puerto Rico was considered a “State” for purposes of the Chapter 9 pre-emption
provision.111 Therefore, it is clear that, prior to 1984, federal law would have preempted the Recovery Act because the Recovery Act would have violated 11 U.S.C.
§ 903(1).112 However, in this case, the parties have conflicting interpretations of how
the 1984 amendment to the definition of “State” altered, if at all, the pre-emption
provision.113 Petitioners (“Puerto Rican Defendants”) interpret the amended
definition of “State” to entirely exclude Puerto Rico from all of Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code.114 Respondents (“Plaintiffs”) interpret the amended definition of
“State” to preclude Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek Chapter
9 relief through the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) gateway provision but nonetheless to include
Puerto Rico for purposes of the pre-emption provision.115 The Majority ultimately
holds that it agrees with Respondents’ interpretation of how the amended definition
of “State” affects Puerto Rico in Chapter 9 bankruptcy. 116
Principally, the Majority opined that the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code should
begin and end its analysis.117 11 U.S.C. § 903 contains an express pre-emption clause

108.

Id. at 1944.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016)
110.
Id. at 1945.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. “[F]ederal law would have pre-empted the Recovery Act because it is a ‘State law prescribing a
method of composition of indebtedness’ for Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities that would bind nonconsenting
creditors.” Id.
113.
Id. at 1945–46.
114.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016). If
Petitioners’ interpretation is correct, the pre-emption provision would not apply to Puerto Rico which would
allow them to “enact their own municipal bankruptcy scheme without running afoul of the code.” Id.
115.
Id. If Respondents’ interpretation is correct, then the pre-emption provision applies to Puerto Rico and
“bars it from enacting the Recovery Act.” Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
109.
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and therefore provides Congress’ pre-emptive intent. 118 The amended definition of
“State” in 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) provides a singular exception which unmistakably
refers only to the 11 U.S.C. § 109 gateway provision.119 The Majority interprets
“Congress’ use of the ‘who may be a debtor’ language in the amended definition of
‘State’ to mean that Congress intended to exclude Puerto Rico from the gateway
provision delineating who may be a debtor under Chapter 9.”120 Therefore, the
Majority determines that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway
provision, and as a result, Puerto Rico’s “municipalities cannot satisfy the
requirements of Chapter 9’s gateway provision until Congress intervenes.” 121
However, Puerto Rico is no less a state for purposes of the pre-emption provision
than it was before the amended definition was enacted in 1984 because the Code has
prohibited “States” from enacting their own municipal bankruptcy schemes for
seventy years.122 “Had Congress intended to ‘alter th[is] fundamental detai[l]’ of
municipal bankruptcy, [the Supreme Court] would expect the text of the amended
definition to say so.”123
Additionally, the Majority weighed in on each of the Dissent’s arguments, noting
that the Dissent adopted many of the Petitioners’ arguments.124 First, the Dissent
argued that “the exclusion of Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway
provision effectively removed Puerto Rico from all of Chapter 9.”125 The Majority
disagrees with this argument by providing that if Congress had intended to exclude
Puerto Rico entirely from Chapter 9, it would have specifically articulated that fact
rather than merely excluding it from only the gateway provision of 11 U.S.C. §
109(c).126 Second, the Dissent argues that the pre-emption provision cannot apply to
Puerto Rico because it is a part of Chapter 9.127 The Majority again disagrees with
this argument because it relies on the fact that Puerto Rico is excluded entirely from
Chapter 9, which it is not.128 Separately, the GDB also raises an argument that neither
the Majority nor the Dissent adopt because it would nullify the pre-emption provision

118.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (quoting
Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011)).
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 1946 (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis
City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)).
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 1947 (citing 60 Stat. 415 (overturning Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 507–09)).
123.
Id. (quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
124.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (2016).
125.
Id. at 1947 (citation omitted).
126.
Id. at 1947–48.
127.
Id. at 1948. “Because Puerto Rico’s municipalities are ineligible for Chapter 9 relief, Chapter 9 cannot
‘affec[t] Puerto Rico’s control over its municipalities,’ according to the Dissent.” Id. (citation omitted).
128.
Id. at 1948–49.
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altogether.129 However, the Court ultimately held that Puerto Rico is a “State” for
purposes of the pre-emption provision and therefore the Recovery Act is pre-empted,
affirming the lower court rulings.130
B. The Dissent Argues that “[t]he structure of the Code and the language and
purpose of [11 U.S.C.] § 903 demonstrate that Puerto Rico’s municipal debt
restructuring law should not be read to be prohibited by Chapter 9”
First, the Dissent disagrees with the Majority’s holding and instead align themselves
with the Petitioner’s reading of the amended definition of “State” which would
entirely exclude Puerto Rico from Chapter 9.131 The Dissent begins by opining that
the crippling debt of Puerto Rico’s three main public utilities, including PREPA, will
soon lead to the failure of vital public services. 132 Correcting this type of situation is
precisely what the bankruptcy system is intended for, and since Congress excluded
Puerto Rico’s municipalities from the federal municipal bankruptcy scheme in
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, Puerto Rico was merely employing a remedy
available to it.133 The Dissent argues that Puerto Rico enacted the Recovery Act,
which resembled Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, to allow Puerto Rico’s utilities
to restructure their debts while continuing to provide these vital public services. 134
Second, the Dissent went into detail on how the structure of the Bankruptcy Code
supports its position.135 The Dissent argues that while bankruptcy is not a one-sizefits-all process, the Bankruptcy Code is a governing body of law for different types
of entities that seek its protection.136 All entities have to initially pass through the
gateway provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 109 to then be subject to a relevant chapter of the
Code.137 Once governed by a specific chapter, the interested parties are only
governed by that chapter and the Bankruptcy Code chapters that apply to all cases.138
The Majority ignores this reading and argues that since the amended definition in 11
129.

Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1948–49 (2016).
Id. at 1949.
131.
Id. at 1949 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
132.
Id. at 1949–50. These vital public services include utilities’ abilities to provide electricity, safe drinking
water, road maintenance, and public transportation. Id. at 1950.
133.
Id. at 1950 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(52), 109(c)).
134.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1950 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
135.
Id. at 1950–53.
136.
Id. at 1950.
137.
Id. at 1951. “Once an entity meets the eligibility requirements for a specific “gateway” set out in § 109
and elects to pass through that gateway, it becomes subject to the relevant chapter of the Code – 7, 9, 11, 12, or
13.” Id.
138.
Id. (citing 1 RICHARD LEVIN & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, BANKRUPTCY CODE
59 (Collier Pamphlet ed. 2015) (“[A]s a general rule, the provisions of the particular chapter apply only in that
chapter.”)).
130.
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U.S.C. § 101(52) prevents Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to file for
Chapter 9, these municipalities are therefore prevented from satisfying the
requirements of the 11 U.S.C. § 109 gateway provision and ultimately filing for
Chapter 9 relief without congressional intervention. 139 However, the Dissent believes
that since Puerto Rico cannot pass through the gateway of 11 U.S.C. § 109, the preemption provision of 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) should also not apply to them. 140
Third, the Dissent focuses on the context of the statutory provision of 11 U.S.C.
§ 903.141 The Dissent reasoned that “Section 903 delineates the balance of power
between the States that can authorize their municipalities to access Chapter 9
protection and the bankruptcy court that would preside over any municipal
bankruptcy commenced under Chapter 9.”142 However, since Puerto Rico cannot
pass through the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) gateway to Chapter 9, the Dissent argues that
this distribution between the State and the bankruptcy court is irrelevant and none of
Chapter 9 should then apply to Puerto Rico, including the pre-emption provision in
11 U.S.C. § 903(1).143 Because of the structure of the code,144 the amendment to 11
U.S.C. § 101(52) excludes Puerto Rico and its municipalities from 11 U.S.C. §
109(c)’s gateway, ultimately excluding Puerto Rico and its municipalities from
Chapter 9 for all purposes.145 Ultimately, the Dissent believes that 11 U.S.C. § 903
is directed at states that can approve their municipalities for Chapter 9 bankruptcy
and therefore it should not pre-empt Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act. 146
IV. ANALYSIS

In Franklin III, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court and First Circuit by
holding that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision but is
a “State” for purposes of the pre-emption provision, and therefore federal law preempts the Recovery Act.147 The Majority reached its holding by focusing on the plain

139.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1951 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
140.
Id. at 1952. “Section 903 by its terms presupposes that Chapter 9 applies only to States who have the
power to authorize their municipalities to invoke its protection.” Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
Id. (citing United States v. Morrow, 266 U.S. 531, 534–35 (1925)).
144.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1952–53 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “[W]ords of a statute must be read in their context and with a view of their place in
the overall statutory scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citation
omitted).
145.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1953 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146.
Id. at 1953–54.
147.
Id. at 1949.
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language of the Bankruptcy Code,148 while the Dissent provided a policy argument
focusing on the entire structure of the Code and the implications such a holding
would have on the citizens of Puerto Rico.149 Additionally, First Circuit Judge Juan
Torruella provided a unique view that comes to the same conclusion as the Majority
through his claims that the 1984 Amendments are invalid all-together.150 However,
where there are no uncertainties or ambiguities in the statutory language of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Court must hold in favor of such language and disregard
arguments contrary to the plain interpretation of federal statutes and inquiries into
congressional intent in drafting such statutes.151
A. The Majority’s Plain, Textual Reading of the Bankruptcy Code Begins and Ends
the Analysis
In Franklin III, the Supreme Court correctly held that Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act is
pre-empted by federal law.152 Justice Thomas, writing for the Majority, appropriately
provided that the “plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends [the]
analysis.”153 In doing so, the Court cited three cases, two of which involve federal
pre-emption, supporting their finding that the plain meaning of a statute or clause
provides the best evidence of Congress’ intent:154 (1) United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc.;155 (2) Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v.
Whiting;156 and (3) Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.157
i. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.
In United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court had to resolve
whether 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code “entitles a creditor to receive
postpetition interest on a nonconsensual oversecured claim allowed in a bankruptcy
proceeding.”158 There are two types of secured claims: (1) voluntary secured claims,

148.

Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1954 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
150. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 346 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582 (2015),
and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Torruella, J., concurring).
151.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (citations omitted).
152.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1949.
153.
Id. at 1946. “Resolving whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ or purposes of the pre-emption provision begins
‘with the language of the statute itself,’ and that ‘is also where the inquiry should end,’ for ‘the statute’s language
is plain.’” Id. (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241).
154.
Id.
155.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
156.
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
157.
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016).
158.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 237.
149.
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which are created by agreement between the creditor and debtor and which are called
“security interests” by the Bankruptcy Code;159 and (2) involuntary secured claims,
such as judicial or statutory liens, which are fixed by operation of law and which do
not require a debtor’s consent.160 Because some courts of appeals had drawn a
distinction between these two types of secured claims for purposes of determining
postpetition interest, the Court had to answer “whether Congress intended that all
oversecured claims be treated the same way for purposes of postpetition interest.” 161
To do so, the Court merely looked at the language of the statute itself. 162
Precedent holds that resolving a dispute over the meaning of a statute begins with
the language of the statute itself,163 and in some cases, as in Ron Pair Enterprises,
the meaning of the language of the statute itself is where the inquiry should end. 164
The only time the plain meaning of the statute itself is not conclusive is in “rare cases
[in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters.”165 In such rare cases, the intention of the
drafters controls.166 Because allowing postpetition interest on nonconsensual
oversecured liens does not contravene the Bankruptcy Code drafters’ intent, does not
conflict with any other section of the Bankruptcy Code, does not conflict with any
important state or federal interest, and does not have a contrary view suggested by
its legislative history,167 the Court, after carefully reviewing the syntax and grammar
of 11 U.S.C. § 506(b), concluded that “[t]he language before us expresses Congress’
intent—that postpetition interest be available—with sufficient precision so that
reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice is hardly necessary.” 168
ii. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting
In Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether federal immigration law pre-empts certain provisions of a recently enacted
Arizona statute.169 The Court provided that federal immigration law, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), expressly pre-empts “any State or local law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)

159.

Id. at 240 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) (1982 ed., Supp.IV)).
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(32) and (47) (1982 ed., Supp.IV)).
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 241.
163.
Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)).
164.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)
(“[T]he sole function of the courts is to enforce [a statute] according to its terms.”)).
165.
Id. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 485 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 242–43.
168.
Id. at 241–42.
169.
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011).
160.
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upon those who employ. . .unauthorized aliens.” 170 Additionally, the Court provided
that Arizona’s statute, the Legal Arizona Workers Act, stated that (1) the licenses of
state employers who knowingly employ unauthorized aliens may be suspended or
revoked, and (2) Arizona employers must use a federal electronic verification system
to confirm that their employees are legally authorized workers.171 To address the
question before them, the Court began by looking at the plain wording of the federal
clause.172
After laying out the facts and procedural history, the Court first analyzed the
Petitioner’s argument that IRCA expressly pre-empts Arizona’s statute. 173 When
federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, the Court “focus[es] on the plain
wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
preemptive intent.”174 The Court found that while IRCA expressly pre-empts some
state powers when dealing with the employment of unauthorized aliens, it also
expressly preserves other rights to which Arizona’s licensing law falls within the
confines.175 Because the Court found that Arizona’s law fell within the plain text of
IRCA, the Court did not feel the need to address, in depth, the Petitioner’s argument
that the legislative history of IRCA supports Petitioner’s interpretation.176 Second,
the Court looked at whether Arizona’s law was impliedly pre-empted by federal
law.177 The Court was not swayed by either of Petitioner’s arguments regarding the
existence of implied pre-emption in this case, and ultimately held that Arizona’s law
is not pre-empted by federal law.178 Supreme Court precedents “establish that a high
threshold must be met if a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with the
purposes of a federal Act.”179
iii. Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
In Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the Supreme Court had to determine whether
federal law pre-empted a Vermont statute aimed at requiring employers to disclose
payments relating to health care claims and other information relating to health care
services.180 The Court noted that the pre-emption clause of the federal law at issue,

170.

Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2)).
Id.
172.
Id. at 594.
173.
Id. at 587–600.
174.
Id. at 594 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
175.
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 600 (2011).
176.
Id. at 599 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)
(Congress’s “authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history.”)).
177.
Id. at 600–11.
178.
Id. at 611.
179.
Id. at 607 (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)).
180.
136 S. Ct. 936, 940 (2016).
171.
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), had been
addressed by the Court before, and the text of ERISA’s express pre-emption clause
was the essential starting point.181 Precedent held that ERISA pre-empts two
categories of state laws: (1) “[w]here a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively
upon ERISA plans. . .or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s
operation. . ., that ‘reference’ will result in pre-emption;” 182 and (2) “ERISA preempts a state law that has an impermissible ‘connection with’ ERISA plans, meaning
a state law that ‘governs. . .a central matter of plan administration’ or ‘interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration.’”183 Because Vermont’s law imposed duties
that were “inconsistent with the central design of ERISA, which is to provide a single
uniform national scheme for the administration of ERISA plans without interference
from laws of the several States even when those law, to a large extent, impose parallel
requirements,” the Court held that ERISA pre-empted and invalidated Vermont’s
reporting statute as applied to ERISA plans.184
In its analysis, the Court provided that “[P]re-emption claims turn on Congress’s
intent.”185 The Court further noted that a state law is only relevant regarding the
“scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive” 186 or “the nature of
the effect of a state law on ERISA plans.”187 The Court was not swayed by any of
the arguments of Respondent, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and ultimately
held that Vermont’s law, as it applied to ERISA plan, was pre-empted by federal law
because “[a]ny presumption against pre-emption, whatever its force in other
instances, cannot validate a state law that enters a fundamental area of [federal]
regulation and thereby counters the federal purposes in the way [the Vermont] state
law does.”188
iv. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III)
In Franklin III, as in Chambers and Gobeille, the Court concluded that the statute
contained an express pre-emption clause and therefore they did not need to invoke
any presumption against pre-emption.189 Where a statute contains an express preemption clause, courts must “focus on the plain wording of the clause, which

181.

Id. at 943.
Id. (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
183.
Id. (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
184.
Id. at 947.
185.
Id. at 946 (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650 (1995)).
186.
Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 946 (2016) (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655).
187.
Id. (quoting Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325).
188.
Id.
189.
Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust (Franklin III), 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016).
182.
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necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”190 Here, the
amended definition of “State” clearly only excludes Puerto Rico for the “purpose of
defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”191 As the Majority notes,
that exception clearly refers to the gateway provision in 11 U.S.C. § 109, which is
titled “who may be a debtor.”192 Because Congress used the specific language “who
may be a debtor” in the amended definition of “State,” and 11 U.S.C. § 109 is titled
“who may be a debtor,” the Majority appropriately interpreted Congress’ intent so as
to only exclude Puerto Rico from the gateway provision. 193 “Similarity of
language . . . is . . . a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari
passu.”194 Additionally, this is not one of those rare cases, as mentioned in Ron Pair,
where the plain meaning of the statute itself is inconclusive, and therefore the drafters
intent controls.195 “There is no reason to suspect that Congress did not mean what the
language of the statute says.”196 Furthermore, the legislative history regarding the
1984 amendment does not reveal any helpful alternative interpretations.197
Regardless, “reliance on legislative history is unnecessary in light of the statute’s
unambiguous language.”198 Therefore, the Supreme Court was correct in holding that
Puerto Rico was pre-empted from enacting the Recovery Act because Puerto Rico is
not considered a “State” for purposes of the gateway provision (i.e. Puerto Rico
cannot authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief).199
While the Dissent provided a few textual and policy arguments in favor of the
Recovery Act, the Majority’s reading of the Bankruptcy Code is the correct
interpretation.200 The Dissent argued that, when read in context of the entire
Bankruptcy Code, “Section 903 by its terms presupposes that Chapter 9 applies only
to States who have the power to authorize their municipalities to invoke is protection”
and “[b]ecause Puerto Rico’s municipalities cannot pass through the § 109(c)
gateway to Chapter 9, nothing in the operation of a Chapter 9 case affects Puerto

190.

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563, 594 U.S. 582 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012).
192.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1946.
193.
Id.
194.
Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam).
195.
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
196.
Id. at 246.
197.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 337 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016); see also Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1953 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
198.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012) (quotations omitted); see also Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.”).
199.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1946.
200.
Id. at 1949–54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
191.
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Rico’s control over its municipalities.”201 The Majority correctly shoots down this
argument by providing that the finding that “Puerto Rico is not a ‘State’ for purposes
of the gateway provision . . . says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ for
the other provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States.” 202 The Majority points out
that it is the debtors themselves and not the states who pass through the gateway
provision.203 Here, the debtors would be the municipalities.204 “[I]f it were Congress’
intent to [] exclude Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes of th[e] pre-emption
provision, it would have said so.”205 Furthermore, the Dissent’s argument that “the
government and people of Puerto Rico should not have to wait for possible
congressional action to avert the consequences of unreliable electricity,
transportation, and safe water,” is a policy argument that does not trump the plain
wording of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.206 However, Congress has already taken
action, as will be discussed in Section IV.C, infra.
B. Judge Juan Torruella’s Concurrence in the Judgment of Franklin II Provides a
Unique Perspective into the Validity of the Recovery Act Based on the Validity of
the 1984 Amendments Themselves
First Circuit Judge Juan Torruella filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in
Franklin II, agreeing with the majority’s conclusion that “the 1984 Amendments are
the ‘key to this case.’”207 While he agreed that Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act
contravenes 11 U.S.C § 903(1) and thus is invalid, he went further to claim the 1984
Amendments themselves are equally invalid. 208 The amendments are invalid in that
they establish bankruptcy legislation that “is not uniform with regard to the rest of
the United States, thus violating the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause of the Constitution,”209 and that they also “contravene both the Supreme
Court’s and [the First Circuit’s] jurisprudence in that there exists no rational basis or
clear policy reasons for their enactment.”210

201.
Andrés González Berdecía, Puerto Rico Before the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional
Colonialism in Action, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 80, 127 (2016) (quoting Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1952
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
202.
Franklin III, 136 S. Ct. at 1947.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 1948.
206.
Id. at 1954 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
207.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 346 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Torruella, J., concurring).
208.
Id.
209.
Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
210.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Because Congress must establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy,
“[p]rohibiting Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to request Chapter 9
relief, while allowing all the states to benefit from such power,” is clearly an abuse
of congressional authority.211 As noted previously in the Supreme Court majority’s
opinion in Franklin III, the language in the Constitution means what it unequivocally
states.212 Therefore, the 1984 Amendments are invalid because they are not applied
uniformly throughout the United States.213
Additionally, according to Judge Torruella, the 1984 Amendments are invalid
because they fail the rational basis requirement which is warranted when considering
the validity of a statute that treats Puerto Rico differently.214 Rational basis review
requires that “the action of removing Puerto Rico’s power to authorize its
municipalities to file under Chapter 9 must be allowed if there is any set of
conceivable reasons rationally related to a legitimate interest of Congress.” 215 Here,
Judge Torruella believes there is no conceivable set of facts rationally related to a
legitimate purpose of Congress.216 First, there is no legislative record outlining
Congress’ reasons behind the 1984 Amendments.217 Second, “[t]he 1984
Amendments deprived Puerto Rico of a fundamental and inherently managerial
function over its municipalities that has no connection to any articulated or
discernible Congressional interest.”218 Ultimately, in Judge Torruella’s opinion, the
1984 Amendments are, again, invalid because there is no rational basis or clear
congressional policy reason for their enactment. Judge Torruella’s persuasive
argument that the amendments are invalid all-together provides a unique perspective
that ultimately leads to the same conclusion as that of the Majority’s holding in
Franklin III.

211.

Id.
Id. at 347 (Torruella, J., concurring).
213.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust v. P.R. (Franklin II), 805 F.3d 322, 347 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 136 S.
Ct. 582 (2015), and cert. granted sub nom. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 582
(2015), and aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Torruella, J., concurring) (citing Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and
the Myth of “Uniform Laws,” 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1141-47 (2012)).
214.
Id. at 348 (citing Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 5
(1978) (per curiam)); see also Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 348 n.43.
215.
Franklin II, 805 F.3d at 348 (Torruella, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
216.
Id.
217.
Id. at 349-50.
218.
Id. at 350–53 (citing Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)).
212.
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C. Congress Passes the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic
Stability Act to Address Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis
On June 30, 2016, President Barrack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”)219 to address
Puerto Rico’s current debt crisis.220 The bill was passed in the House of
Representatives on June 9, 2016221 and passed in the Senate on June 29, 2016.222
PROMESA provides for the creation of a seven-member Oversight Board that has
control over Puerto Rico’s budget, laws, financial plans, and regulations.223 The
Oversight Board, which is not accountable to the Puerto Rican government, has the
power to force the Puerto Rican government “to balance its budget and force a
restructuring with bondholders and other creditors if an agreement is not reached.” 224
PROMESA also permits the lowering of the federal minimum wage for Puerto Rican
workers of twenty-four years of age and under.225
Under the Act, a territory, like Puerto Rico, “may qualify as a debtor if it requests
the establishment of an Oversight Board [] or has one established for it by Congress,
and the Oversight Board has issued a restructuring certification for that entity.” 226 A
voluntary bankruptcy case may then be commenced by the Oversight Board filing a
petition that must comply with PROMESA and Chapter 11 provisions. 227
Additionally, an automatic stay went into effect upon the enactment of PROMESA
to which courts may grant a relief from stay to prevent irreparable damage to the
interest of the entity in property.228
While PROMESA is aimed at alleviating Puerto Rico’s debt crisis, some of its
provisions have been criticized as not being directly related to fiscal issues. 229 An
example is that the Oversight Board is allowed to “designate energy and
infrastructure projects as ‘critical’ and bypass[] public review or environmental
219.
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, 130 Stat 549
(2016).
220.
Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS (June 30,
2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741
(“Obama said it will provide ‘more stability, better services and greater prosperity over the long term for the
people of Puerto Rico.’”).
221.
Donna Higgins, Experts: Congress must step up after Puerto Rico debt law struck down, Westlaw:
Bankruptcy Daily Briefing, 2016 WL 3249406.
222.
Stephen Nuno, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 29,
2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-act-puerto-rico-debt-crisis-n601291.
223.
Guadalupe, supra note 220.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Bankruptcy Law Reports Letter No. 960, Bankr. L. Rep. P 4252625 (2016).
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Guadalupe, supra note 220.
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impact studies.”230 New Jersey Senator Robert Menéndez condemned the bill saying
“PROMESA exacts a price far too high for relief that is far too uncertain.” 231 New
York Congresswoman Nydia Velázquez voted for the bill despite its shortfalls
because “there [were] simply no other politically feasible options left on the table.” 232
Furthermore, while many influential Puerto Ricans and additional U.S. Congressmen
agree with the opposition’s view of the bill, they also agree that the bill is necessary
to provide a short legal stay so that the Oversight Board can retake Puerto Rico from
the creditors.233
V. CONCLUSION

In Franklin III, the Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act was preempted by federal law.234 While the Majority’s method of interpreting the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code was the correct course of action, 235 additional
notable interpretations and policy arguments were raised in regards to the
Bankruptcy Code itself as well as this holding’s implications on the citizens of Puerto
Rico.236 However, while Puerto Rico and the Dissent may not have found solace
through the judiciary’s resolution of this matter, Congress’ swift passing of
PROMESA has provided Puerto Rico with an initial opportunity to address its
current financial situation.237

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
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See supra at note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A.
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